Dreams as a source of supernatural agent concepts by Patrick McNamara & Kelly Bulkeley
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY
published: 19 March 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00283
Edited by:
Sue Llewellyn,
University of Manchester, UK
Reviewed by:
Richard Schweickert,
Purdue University, USA
Trevor A. Harley,
University of Dundee, UK
*Correspondence:
Patrick McNamara,
Department of Neurology, Boston
University School of Medicine –
Veterans Affairs Boston Healthcare
System, Boston, MA 02130, USA
pmcnamar3@gmail.com;
mcnamar@bu.edu
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Psychopathology, a section of the
journal Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 05 January 2015
Accepted: 26 February 2015
Published: 19 March 2015
Citation:
McNamara P and Bulkeley K (2015)
Dreams as a source of supernatural
agent concepts.
Front. Psychol. 6:283.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00283
Dreams as a source of supernatural
agent concepts
Patrick McNamara1* and Kelly Bulkeley2
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USA, 2 Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
We present a theory of the creativity of dreams as well as psychopathology of religious
delusions with respect to production of fundamental forms of religious cognition—
specifically supernatural agent (SA) cognitions. We suggest that dream cognitions are
particularly efficient at producing highly memorable and impactful experiences with SAs
because dreams involve three processes that are prerequisites for the generation of god
concepts: (1) mental simulations of alternative realities, (2) theory of mind attributions to
the extra-natural dream characters and divine beings, and (3) attribution of ultimate value
(exemplified by ‘good spirit beings’), and dis-value (exemplified by demonic monsters)
to the supernatural dream characters. Because prefrontal cortex is deactivated during
rapid eye movements (REM) sleep agentic impulses and internally generated ideas are
not reliably attributed to Self or dreamer. Instead an exaggerated degree of agency is
attributed to these supernatural dream characters who are then embedded in stories
in dreams and in myths of waking life which explain their supernatural abilities. These
dream-based SAs are salient characters that are processed in sleep-related memory
systems according to rules of Lleweelyn’s ancient art of memory model and therefore
more easily remembered and reflected upon during waking life. When REM sleep
intrudes into waking consciousness, as is the case with some forms of schizophrenia,
religious delusions are more likely to emerge.
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Introduction
In this paper we highlight dreams as a source of creativity-speciﬁcally in the realm of reli-
gious ideas. We also detail a role for dreams in production of religious delusions associated
with certain forms of psychopathology such as schizophrenia. For over a century anthropol-
ogists working in every part of the world have amply documented the importance of the
dream as a primary source for religious ideas and practices of traditional peoples (Tylor,
1870; Lincoln, 1935; Grunebaum and Caillois, 1966; Tedlock, 1992). In many traditional soci-
eties dreams were considered direct, experiential evidence of a spirit realm (see reviews in
Bulkeley, 2008a; Mittermaier, 2010). Many trial peoples interpreted their dreams as cases where
the dreamer’s soul wanders outside the body and communes with the gods and spirit beings of
the spirit world (e.g., Gregor, 1981; Lohmann, 2003a,b,c). Harner (1984), reports that the South
American Jívaro consider dreams to be populated by spirit beings who often are, or become
the focus of their sacred rituals and stories. The Zuni and Quiché Maya traditions studied by
Tedlock (1992) see dreams as direct communications from sacred ancestors. The Tikopia (Firth,
2001) in Polynesia see many dreams as direct communication of spirit beings to the dreamer.
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The characters populating these dreams can be described, in
the language of the cognitive science of religion, as supernatu-
ral agents (SAs): non-human entities with autonomous powers
and intentions. Their bodies may not be clearly seen, but they do
have minds and they frequently have unusual powers far beyond
the capabilities of ordinary agents (e.g., ﬂying, time-travel, mind-
reading; Boyer, 2002). More speciﬁcally, these SAs can be charac-
terized as “minimally counterintuitive.” “Counterintuitive (CI)”
means their unusual abilities violate our intuitive assumptions
about what normal agents can and cannot do. They are “mini-
mally” CI because they violate some of our intuitive assumptions,
but not all of them. They are just CI enough to draw attention and
arouse curiosity without overwhelming comprehension, making
them easier to remember, and describe to other people. CI con-
cepts can be scored in narratives (Barrett, 2008). If we use Barrett’s
scoring criteria for CI concepts we ﬁnd that dreams are ﬁlled with
them (McNamara, unpublished data).
Boyer argued that the CI properties of SAs makes them more
memorable. If an agent is too CI and violates our assumptions in
too many ways, we will have more diﬃculty recalling its char-
acteristics and telling other people about it (a crucial factor in
how religions spread over time). However, if an agent is not CI
enough, it will not make a strong enough impression on aware-
ness, and it will thus sink into general forgetfulness. The notion of
“minimally counterintuitive” SAs is intended to designate a cog-
nitively optimal set of features that give god concepts a strong,
innately compelling appeal to the human mind.
Despite the abundance of anthropological evidence linking
people’s beliefs in SAs with dream experiences, few eﬀorts have
beenmade to explain the brain/mind processes connecting dream
cognitions and religious cognitions. In this paper we present evi-
dence in favor of the hypothesis that supernatural agent cognitions
are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by nightly dream content patterns. We
present several interrelated strands of evidence to support the
plausibility of this idea and explain the mechanisms involved.
We begin with an overview of the neurobiology of rapid eye
movements (REM) and non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep
states insofar as this neurobiology relates to dream cognitions.
We then review historical and cross-cultural evidence linking
dream cognitions to SA cognitions. We conclude with a pre-
sentation of a theory as to how dream cognitions generate SA
cognitions.
REM and NREM Sleep States
When measured electrophysiologically, sleep (in humans) is
composed of four major stages. The ﬁrst three (N1–N3) stages
constitute NREM sleep, and are best described by polysomno-
graphic and electroencephalographic (EEG) criteria. The fourth
stage is not part of NREM sleep and is characterized by peri-
odic or phasic bursts of REM under the closed eyelids. REM
sleep is indicated by EEG data, electroculographic activity,
and a reduction in electromyographic (EMG) activity. EMG
electrodes are usually placed under the chin, and indicate
when the muscle paralysis characteristic of REM sleep occurs
(Rechtschaﬀen and Kales, 1968).
Rapid eye movements and NREM sleep states alternate
throughout the night in a period of about 90 min. Stage N1
is a transitional stage to N2 or light sleep. N3 is composed
of slow-wave sleep which is particularly potent during the
childhood phase of development. NREM stages dominate the
ﬁrst third of the night, while REM dominates the last third
(Carskadon and Rechtschaﬀen, 2000). A sleep cycle is deﬁned as
a period of NREM sleep followed by a period of REM sleep.
During a single night, a person will progress through three or
four NREM–REM sleep cycles, each lasting 90–110 min and
becoming progressively longer through the night. Usually, the
NREM period will last about 80 min or longer, followed by
a REM period that can be as short as 1 min in the early
cycles. Toward the morning REM periods can last as long as
45 min.
Rapid eye movement sleep accounts for about 22% of total
sleep time in humans. The cortex, particularly the limbic region,
is very highly activated in REM. The phasic aspects of REM,
such as intermittent muscle twitching, autonomic nervous system
(ANS) discharges, and REM, occur in some mammals in associa-
tion with bursts of pontine-geniculo-occipital waves. Mammals
(with the possible exception of humans) also exhibit a theta
rhythm in the hippocampal formation during REM night.
Rapid eye movement’s tonic characteristics are a desynchro-
nized EEG, penile erections, and atonia of the antigravity muscles.
Its phasic characteristics include bursts of REM under the closed
eyelids, myoclonic twitches of the facial, and limb muscle groups,
increased variability in heart rate, respiration, and blood pressure,
and ANS discharges. Other correlates of REM include eﬀects on
release of selected hormones – especially growth factors. Virtually
all mammals (with some exceptions such as certain seamammals)
exhibit both SWS and REM sleep.
Rapid eye movements sleep demonstrates high activation
levels in limbic/amygdaloid sites, in dopaminergic, and cholin-
ergic circuits but deactivation of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
sites (Maquet et al., 1996; Braun et al., 1997; Maquet and Franck,
1997; Nofzinger et al., 1997; Hobson et al., 1998; Dang-Vu et al.,
2007; Hobson, 2007), as well as cessation of activation in
the noradrenergic locus ceruleus and the serotoninergic raphe
nucleus. Stage N2 sleep involves higher activation levels in ﬁl-
iative paralimbic regions in the cortex relative to REM sleep
and to the deep sleep of NREM stage ‘slow wave sleep.’
Larson-Prior et al. (2009) examined MRI-blood oxygen depen-
dent signal functional connectivity using conventional seed-
based analyses in several cortical sites as healthy young adults
entered NREM sleep from wakefulness. Functional connectiv-
ity was maintained in cortical networks in NREM sleep. Thus
both NREM N2 stage sleep and REM sleep are characterized
by brain activity patterns that can support complex cognitive
processes.
Dream content diﬀers to some extent across REM and NREM
sleep states, and so SA cognitions may also diﬀer in relation
to sleep states. For example, using the standardized / Hall Van
de Castle dream scoring scales (Hall and Van de Castle, 1966;
Domhoﬀ, 1996), dreams obtained from N2 stage sleep tend to be
more thought-like, less bizarre, and less emotional than dreams
obtained from REM (Domhoﬀ, 1996). McNamara et al. (2005)
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scored REM and NREM dreams and wake reports for number
and variety of social interactions. We found that aggression levels
were higher in REM vs. NREM, or wake reports and that con-
versely, dreamer-initiated friendliness was more characteristic of
NREM than REM. These ﬁndings were recently replicated using
standard polysomnographic and EEG sleep-staging techniques
(McNamara et al., 2010). One straightforward hypothesis ﬂow-
ing from these data with respect to SA cognitions is that friendly
spirits would more often though not exclusively be encountered
in NREM dreams and less friendly or demonic spirits would
be encountered more often, though not exclusively in REM
dreams.
Rapid eye movements physiology can intrude into daytime
consciousness and when it does it may create delusional states. It
is well established that sleep deprivation reliably produces com-
pensatory attempts to enter REM throughout the day resulting in
REM microsleeps as well as reports of dreamy states and disso-
ciative symptoms.(Limosani et al., 2011; Palagini and Rosenlicht,
2011) The role of REM-irruptions into waking consciousness is
well-recognized in narcolepsy where the associated experience
is the production of hypnagogic hallucinations. Mahowald et al.
(2011) and van der Kloet et al. (2012) review a range of evi-
dence which demonstrates that dissociative symptoms such as
absorption, derealization, depersonalization, and other symp-
toms associated with a range of psychiatric disturbances orig-
inate from sleep. REM intrusion has been reported to con-
tribute to symptoms and delusional states in schizophrenia
(Gottesmann and Gottesman, 2007; Cohrs, 2008). Religious delu-
sions and unusual religious experiences are more frequent among
schizophrenic patients with positive symptoms compared to
that of the general population (Siddle et al., 2002; Kimhy et al.,
2005; Green et al., 2006; Huguelet et al., 2006; Mohr et al., 2010).
Religious delusions are erroneous beliefs that a SA is shaping
the experiences of the rooted patient. The content of religious
delusions are typically persecutory (e.g., ill-intending evil spir-
its) and involve alterations in sense of self including grandiosity
or extreme self-denigration and these delusions are even more
resistant to rational disconﬁrmation than other types of delu-
sions.
Having reviewed the fundamental neurology of REM and
NREM sleep states as well as ways in which REM and dreamsmay
impact psychopathology we turn now to evidence for the view
that SA cognitions are causally related to dream cognitions.
Dreams in History of Religions
According to early anthropologists like Tylor (1870) it seems
probable that humans ﬁrst entertained the idea of a spirit
realm because they directly experienced such a realm in their
dreams. Researchers working in many diﬀerent parts of the
world have found that people in traditional societies treat dreams
as the sources of their religious ideas, including their con-
cepts of their gods and other supernatural beings (e.g., Gregor,
1981 on Amazonia; and Lohmann, 2003a,b,c on Oceania; and
Tonkinson, 1974, on Aboriginal Australia; Shweder and LeVine,
1975; Keesing, 1982; Shweder and Bourne, 1982; Shaw, 1992;
Hollan, 2003; Robbins, 2003). It is likely that ancestral popula-
tions also treated them as such. Dreams were considered proof of
the gods and a spirit realm since dreams were involuntary and
emotionally vivid experiences that involved the dreamer’s soul
encountering other beings including long deceased relatives and
so on. Dreams have therefore played a major role in the historical
evolution of religions.
Although the ﬁrst glimmers of religious consciousness likely
occurred in tandem with Neanderthal burials some 100,000 years
before the present, the ﬁrst clear signs of the emergence of
SAs occurs in the hundreds of cave art sites that have been
dated to the Upper Paleolithic. In the Chauvet cave that dates
to some 28,000 years ago, there are many images of theri-
anthropes or human-animal hybrids that very likely depicted SAs.
Ancient rock art from all over the world also very often depicts
masked human forms and therianthropes. The Tassili rock art
of the Sahara depict therianthrope SAs that date to a time (the
Neolithic and perhaps earlier) when the Sahara still contained
grasslands where ﬂocks of animals could be hunted. The rock
art of the San of South Africa depict larger than life hunters
garbed in animal masks and skins. The rock art of native tribes of
Australia that date back many 1000s of years also depict similar
therianthropes.
The examples could be multiplied many times over. This sug-
gests that SA ﬁgures ﬁrst occurred in the visionary dreams of
the people who painted these images. A number of scholars
have argued that traditional diviners/healers known as shamans
may have painted some of these images (Lewis-Williams, 2002;
Hayden, 2003). Current ethonographic evidence (Eliade, 1964)
suggests that shamans contact their spirit helpers and divine
being via two methods: ecstatic states induced by entheogens, or
other methods and via dream states. We have evidence that that
is how the shamans of the upper paleolithic derived their god ﬁg-
ures as well. Right at the beginning of the upper Paleolithic we
have an image of a shaman in headdress with antlers and ani-
mal skins at Fumane cave in Italy dated to 35,000 years ago. The
“sorcerer” image from the cave at Les Trois Freres shows a man
wearing animal skins, arms outstretched like a horse rearing with
a reindeer antler headdress, owlish eyes, bear paws, and human
beard. Another image can only be seen by lowering oneself down
via rope into the famous ‘shaft’ at Lascaux. The image should
really be termed a composition as it depicts some sort of interac-
tion between a wounded bison and a therianthropic ﬁgure lying
below the bison. The ﬁgure is of a man with an erection and a
bird-like head. Standing upright next to the man is his staﬀ. The
staﬀ has the same sort of bird perched on top. The bird is proba-
bly the totem animal for this shaman.Many shamans believe they
become birds when they ﬂy into the heavens when traveling to
the spirit world. The fact that the man has an erection suggests
that he is dreaming in REM sleep (dreams and erections invari-
ably occur in association with REM). The shaman is dreaming the
sacriﬁce of the bison and the bison is considered a sacred spirit
being.
We have seen that dreams likely played a role in creation of
religious consciousness at the dawn of the human adventure.
They have continued to play a role in religious consciousness ever
since (Bulkeley, 2008a,b). All the world’s religious traditions have
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pointed to dreams as spiritual events of extreme importance in
the transformation of the self and with respect to communication
with the spirit world (see O’Flaherty, 1986; Jedrej and Shaw, 1992;
Irwin, 1994; Young, 1999; Mittermaier, 2010). This is not the
place to document the full extent of the multiple roles of dream-
ing in the world’s religions, but two highlights can be mentioned
to suggest the close connection between dreaming experience and
religious concepts.
First is a Biblical story, sacred to Jews, Christians, and
Muslims alike, about the patriarch Jacob, and his dream theo-
phany, reported in Genesis 28. The dream occurred after Jacob
had tricked his blind father Isaac into giving him the bless-
ing that should have gone to his older brother, Esau. Enraged
at this trickery, Esau made a vow to kill Jacob. However, their
mother, Rebekah, overheard Esau, and she arranged for Jacob
to visit relatives in a distant village, giving him the opportu-
nity to escape before his brother can ﬁnd and murder him.
Away Jacob went, out into the wilderness. One night during his
solitary journey through the deserts of ancient Canaan he lay
down, placed a stone under his head for a pillow, and went to
sleep:
“And he dreamed that there was a ladder set up on the earth, and
the top of it reached to heaven; and behold, the angels of God were
ascending and descending on it! And behold, the Lord stood above
it, and said, ‘I am the Lord, the God of Abraham your father and
the God of Isaac. The land on which you lie I will give to you and
to your descendants; and your descendants shall be like the dust of
the earth, and you shall spread abroad to the west and to the east,
and to the north, and to the south; and by you and your descen-
dants shall all the families of the earth bless themselves. Behold,
I am with you and will keep you wherever you go, and will bring
you back to this land; for I will not leave you until I have done that
of which I have spoken to you.”
(Gen. 28:12–15, RSV; Metzger and Murphy, 1991).
Jacob awoke from this dream ﬁlled with wonder, surprise, and
fear. “Surely the Lord is in this place; and I did not know it,”
he says to himself. “How awesome is this place! This is none
other than the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven.” At
a time of deep personal uncertainty, with his life in danger and
his future totally unknown, Jacob experienced an overwhelming
dream vision of heavenly angels, with the reassuring words of
God to soothe his fears and rouse his procreative energies.
Whether or not there was really a man named Jacob who actu-
ally had this dream, we can recognize in this Biblical story an
early awareness of the wonder-working power of dreaming and
its inﬂuence on religious beliefs about SAs.
A second example, not nearly as well known, comes from an
ancient Japanese Buddhist context. The 11th century C. E. woman
known as Lady Sarashina (her real name is not known) recorded
a number of dreams in her diary, translated as As I Crossed a
Bridge of Dreams (Morris, 1971). Toward the end of her life, after
her husband had died and her hopes for working in the romantic
world of the Imperial palace had been dashed, she described the
following, which occurred on “the thirteenth night of the Tenth
Month of the third year of Tenki”:
“[I] dreamt that Amida Buddha was standing in the far end of our
garden. I could not see him clearly, for a layer of mist seemed to
separate us, but when I peered through the mist I saw that he was
about six foot tall and that the lotus pedestal on which he stood
was about four feet oﬀ the ground. He glowed with a golden light,
and one of his hands was stretched out, while the other formed
a magical sign. He was invisible to everyone but me. I had been
greatly impressed but at the same time frightened and did not dare
move near my blinds to get a clearer view of him. He had said, ‘I
shall leave now, but later I shall return to fetch you.’ And it was
only I who could hear his voice.”
(Morris, 1971, 107).
This dream of intimate communion with a SA made a big
impact on Lady Saraﬁna—“thereafter it was on this dream alone
that I set my hopes for salvation.” Like Jacob, her waking life
seemed bleak and hopeless, and in that emotional context she has
a vivid, highly memorable dream of a beneﬁcent deity who pro-
vides reassurance and a revived sense of hopefulness about the
future.
Manymore cross-cultural examples could be oﬀered, but these
should be suﬃcient to indicate the strong and widely felt impact
that dreams have had on people’s religious and spiritual concepts
throughout history.
Dreams as a Source for Religious
Cognitions
Wehave summarized the view that dreams have been a key source
for religious cognitions and experiences throughout the history
of religions. We now present a theory as to how dreams act as a
source for religious cognitions.
First, for many people dreams present direct evidence of a
spirit realm and of disembodied spirits. For example, in so called
visitation dreams the dreamer sees a beloved friend or relative
who in waking life has died. In the dream the loved one delivers a
message to the dreamer that he or she is well. The dreamer awak-
ens with an absolute conviction that the person in the dream was
really, truly the loved one. The “visitation” is often described as
so real and lifelike that grief over the death of the loved one is sig-
niﬁcantly diminished and the dreamer feels that contact with the
deceased is real.
Second, many people experience direct contact with a super-
natural being in their dreams. The dream of Lady Saraﬁna men-
tioned above is a good example of such a dream. The contact with
a divine ﬁgure is once again experienced as intensely real, awe
inspiring and deﬁnitive. The impact of this contact with a divine
being is so signiﬁcant for the dreamer that it changes his or her
life for months or years thereafter.
We suggest that dream cognitions are particularly eﬃcient
at producing highly memorable and impactful experiences with
SAs because dreams involve three processes that are prerequi-
sites for the generation of god concepts: (1) mental simulations
of alternative realities, (2) theory of mind (ToM) attributions,
and (3) computation of ultimate value (exempliﬁed by ‘good spirit
beings’), and dis-value (exempliﬁed by demonic monsters).
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Dreams as Mental Simulations
Many theorists have attempted to characterize the species of cog-
nition one sees in dreams. One proposal that has received some
preliminary empirical support is that many dreams specialize in
mental simulations of worlds or states of aﬀairs diﬀerent from the
waking world. Of course the spiritual realm is one such “world”
for most religious traditions. McNamara et al. (2001) has pro-
posed that mental simulations of alternative worlds or of ultimate
realities can be either oriented to the past, in which case they
are counterfactuals, or they can be oriented toward the future,
in which case they are examples of prospection. A third form of
simulation important for dreams is projection of the self as in
ToM attributions. We will discuss ToM attributions below. Here
we remark on past- and future-oriented mental simulations that
occur in dreams.
Dreams very likely play a role in “episodic prospection” or
“episodic future thought” (Spuznar, 2010) such as planning,
development of goals, generation of desires, mental simulations
of possible worlds, imagination of future scenarios, and contin-
gencies, and daydreaming about possibilities. For example, in
dreams the dreamer is virtually always desiring, planning, imag-
ing, plotting, striving, simulating possible worlds, and in general
aiming at some future outcome. Dreams are goal driven and that
is why they are sometimes spoken of as narratives, stories, or
episodes.
McNamara et al. (2001, 2002) has discussed past-oriented
counterfactual simulations in dreams. Counterfactuals in logic
characterize conditions under which some state of aﬀairs might
have been true. In philosophy and in language semantics coun-
terfactuals have been used to characterize modal event logics
and to use possible world scenarios to evaluate formal languages.
In economics counterfactuals are crucial to a range of theories
concerning risk and decision-making rules under conditions of
regret and attempts to avoid losses. In psychology and cognitive
neuroscience counterfactuals are treated as mental simulations of
possible worlds or states of aﬀairs.
Regardless of the various ways in which counterfactuals are
treated in these disparate intellectual disciplines, the common
denominator is that they are mental simulations of what might
have happened if I had chosen diﬀerently or performed slightly
diﬀerently. Their appearance in dreams have been documented
by McNamara et al. (2002).
Theory of Mind Attributions
Theory of mind attributions are ubiquitous in dreams.
Schweickert and Xi (2010) found an average of nine instances of
ToMs per dream in a set of dreams they studied. Thus dreams
satisfy one of the main requirements that many theories of
religious cognition demand for thinking about SAs, namely
the capacity to generate ToM attributions. But we believe that
the generation of SAs requires more than mental simulation of
possible worlds and/or the capacity to do ToM attributions. To
ascribe religious signiﬁcance to a super-natural being in a dream
or wake state I need to do more than to simply cognize or realize
that that being has a mind like mind, I also have to reverence
or fear (or both) that being; I have to in short impute value or
signiﬁcance to that being.
Computation of Value
Although many authors have asserted that the proximate ori-
gins of god concepts are ToM attributions, it is not clear to us
that the mind-reading system, by itself, produces the kinds of
SAs that generally populate religious ideologies or traditions. It
is not clear how hierarchical meta-representations or processes
like these yield a deity that we feel awe and reverence for. For
most human beings throughout history reading the god’s minds
was not a primary goal. Rather it was establishing a relationship
with the god that mattered because that god represented power
and one’s highest values. For most human beings gods demand
worship or reverence and often fear. A human being cannot be
in the presence of a thing of immense value and power with-
out some sort of emotional response like reverence, devotion, or
commitment.
It is this latter stance of commitment to the god that is miss-
ing from ToM and related accounts of religious cognition. We
not only attempt to know and be known by a god. We attempt
to relate to them, to unite ourselves to them, or in the case of
demonic SAs, we attempt to ﬂee/avoid them. There is an emo-
tional response because matters of ultimate concern are involved
where religious cognition is concerned.
We have mentioned above how dreams typically involve the
dreamer pursuing or trying to attain to some desired state or
to avoid a fearful outcome. These are obviously instances of
perception of value and pursuit of value. The neurobiology of
REM and NREM sleep states is now understood to involve
forebrain mesocortical dopaminergic systems that directly com-
pute value and dis-value (Perogamvros and Schwartz, 2012). In
addition, with respect to REM itself, replicated ﬁndings have
shown decreased anterior-posterior EEG coherence at gamma
frequencies during REM vs. NREM sleep (Perez-Garci et al.,
2001; Corsi-Cabrera et al., 2003, 2008) as well as in phasic
vs. tonic REM sleep (Corsi-Cabrera et al., 2008). Coherence
decreases appear to reﬂect limbic and amygdalar activation dur-
ing REM sleep that is particularly enhanced during phasic REM
sleep. Limbic and amgdalar systems are core systems involved
in the computation of value. REM sleep demonstrates high
activation levels in midline, ventral paralimbic areas, includ-
ing medial prefrontal cortex, along with deactivation of lat-
eral prefrontal cortices (Maquet et al., 1996; Braun et al., 1997;
Maquet and Franck, 1997; Nofzinger et al., 1997, 2004) identify
a midline anterior paralimbic areas that includes both sub-
cortical areas such as basal forebrain, hypothalamus, ventral
striatum, and hippocampus as well as paralimbic cortices such
as insula, anterior cingulate, orbitofrontal cortex, and supple-
mentary motor area. Reactivation of these paralimbic area, as
well as deactivation of dorsal prefrontal regions with the transi-
tion into REM sleep has now been widely replicated (reviewed
in Maquet et al., 2005; Nofzinger et al., 2006; Pace-Schott et al.,
2009).
In short, the phenomenology of dreaming and the neuro-
biology of sleep suggest that dreaming cognition reﬂects the
processing of value-related information. The fact that both
dreams and religious cognitions are particularly concerned with
the computation of ultimate values provides one more empirical
link between them.
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To summarize, dreams exhibit the three core functional
capacities that are required for production of SAs: mental sim-
ulations of other worlds, ToM attributions, and computations of
ultimate value.
This means all humans are endowed with brains innately
primed to daily generate god concepts in dreaming.
Mechanisms
But how do dreams do it? At a minimum, we assume that the
dreaming mind/brain constructs SAs via the ascription of agency
to selected “other” characters in dreams.When a superabundance
of agential attributes are attributed to these characters we get
a divine being. Now the reason the dreamer ascribes agency to
other characters in dreams is due to change in the normal way in
which agency is constructed in the normal course of daily events
in waking life. We discuss the construction of the sense of agency
in waking life next.
Cognitive Models of Agency
Most of us can think inward thoughts and know that we are the
source of those thoughts. However, schizophrenics, people with
active bipolar disease and other individuals with neuropsychiatric
disorder do not understand or believe that they are the source of
the thoughts in their heads. How does this happen?
To see how someone can fail to see their own thoughts or
actions as issuing from themselves we need to ﬁrst say a little
about how the predictive brain works to conﬁrm its own actions.
Most neuroscientists believe that the way in which this is accom-
plished is that whenever we think a thought or issue an action the
brain issues an unconscious prediction of the predicted eﬀects of
that action or thought in the real world. If those predicted eﬀects
occur then the brain gets the conﬁrmation it needs to conclude
that the action or thought came from itself. If unpredicted eﬀects
occur then the brain needs to do further work to ﬁgure out whats
going wrong. In a neuropsychiatrically impaired individual that
further work is impeded or not done at all so the brain concludes
that the thought or action must have come from outside the self
or from some other being.
In short, the subjective experience of ownership of one’s
own thoughts and of control over sensory events emerges
from an unconscious comparison between intentional and pre-
dicted /anticipated eﬀects of one’s actions: if there is a match,
there is an increased tendency to experience the eﬀect as self-
caused, whereas a mismatch between anticipated and actual eﬀect
increases the tendency to attribute the eﬀect to an external cause.
The brain uses sensory feedback mechanisms wherein sensory
eﬀects of the action are assessed, to determine if there is a
match or mis-match between intended vs. predicted eﬀects of
the action. If predicted eﬀects occur then sensory feedback will
be attenuated relative to a case where anticipated eﬀects do not
occur.
In REM dreaming we know that the prefrontal cortex acti-
vation levels are downregulated relative to waking levels. It is
entirely possible therefore that the normal attenuation process of
sensory feedback does not occur as eﬃciently as it does in waking.
Thus the dreamer may conclude that the source of the eﬀerent
signals that arise from intentional scenarios that occur in dreams
is not himself, so he therefore ascribes it to some other animate
being in the dream. If there is no match between predicted and
actual eﬀects (and there cannot be in the dream) then there is
little or no basis for ascribing intentional actions to the self and
a corresponding increased pressure to ascribe them to another
character who is invested with a very strong sense of agency-thus
a divine being.
Although we know of no direct empirical studies on dream
content that unequivocally links the REM-associated diminu-
tion in agency in the dreamer with a corresponding increase in
agency in a special OTHER dream character, we think exam-
ples abound in the dreams we all have each night. Consider the
ubiquitous dream theme of the dreamer attempting to escape
from a pursuer. The dreamer seems unable to run fast enough
to evade the pursuer or ﬁnd ways to stop the pursuer who
becomes more frightening as he advances on the dreamer. Or
consider the norms on dream content variables derived from the
Hall and Van de Castle standardized scoring system used now
in hundreds of dream content studies (see Domhoﬀ, 2003 for
review). “Victimization” of the dreamer is reported in greater
than 65% of dreams; self negativity appears in 66% of dreams;
dreamer-involved success is found in less than 50% of dreams
and misfortunes for the dreamer occur in greater than one third
of dreams. Clearly most dreams involve setbacks or a diminution
of agency in the dreamer. New research should assess potential
links or quantitative correlations between the appearance of mis-
fortune for the dreamer and greater success, power, or vividness
for an opposing dream character.
Once a dream character has been invested with magical pow-
ers of agency and power in a dream these privileged characters
then need to be processed specially so that they are selectively
remembered as “special” during waking life. Llewellyn’s recent
theory of the ways in which REM andNREM sleep states use clas-
sical mnemonic processes to encode memories can help explain
why “special” beings are so often remembered as part of dreams:
in Llewellyn’s model elaborative encoding in REM can, at least
partially, be understood through ancient art of memory (AAOM)
principles: visualization, bizarre association, organization, narra-
tion, embodiment, and location. Visualization of a divine being
occurs in order to instantiate the required ascription of agency
to a character after self ascription fails. Once visualization of a
divine being occurs his or her special powers are put on display
in a dream scenario thus forming bizarre associations with the
ﬁgure. The encounter with the divine being, as in lady Seraﬁna’s
dream above, occurs in a special sacred location and thereby elic-
its intense emotion. Finally the encounter between the dreamer
and the divine being is embedded in a narrative derived from the
local culture that generally has the deity imparting some message
to the dreamer.
Conclusion
There can be little doubt that dream experiences have been
thoroughly intertwined with the religious beliefs, practices, and
experiences of people all over the world, throughout history.
Although dreams are diﬃcult to study scientiﬁcally, the sheer
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fact of their psychological and cultural ubiquity makes them an
important topic for brain-mind research as well as for a scien-
tiﬁc theory of religion. We have argued that new advances in
the cognitive science of religion, particularly regarding SAs and
the cognitive foundations of agency, can illuminate some of the
neurological processes at work in dreaming that naturally lend
themselves to attributions of special powers to “special charac-
ters/beings” in dreams and therefore to religious meaning and
purpose.
We have also reviewed evidence suggesting that some psy-
chiatric symptoms such as dissociative states and delusions
have been linked with REM parasomnias and intrusion of
REM into waking consciousness (due to sleep deprivation or
to disease related breakdown in normal sleep architecture).
In those psychiatric disorders that evidence sleep deprivation
and REM fragmentation as well as religious delusions such as
schizophrenia, the mechanism producing religious delusions
may be illuminated by some of the links between dreams and
SA cognitions we discuss in this paper.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss possible meth-
ods of inﬂuencing, shaping, or guiding this religion-generating
capacity of dreaming. We can point to examples like the dream
incubation rituals performed at the ancient temples of the Greek
healing god Askelpius, and suggest that these practices were eﬀec-
tive because they skillfully channeled all mental and physical
energies toward the healing process. The brain is not an isolated
organ; every individual has been raised in a cultural environment
that shapes the functioning of the mind in waking and in dream-
ing. Future research should consider exploring the cultural and
psychological dynamics underlying these ritual practices.
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